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SPEECH
UNITED STATES-KOREAN RELATIONS:
TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz*
In the early 1950s, more than a million Americans spent months,
and in many cases years, slogging up and down the Korean peninsula.'
Included among that number were Senator John Glenn, Congressman
Charles Rangel, and several of my other colleagues in the United
States Congress. Since I was only a young boy at the time, I missed out
on that visit. But I've been trying to make up for my late start ever
since.
This is my ninth trip to South Korea. Apart from Senator Glenn,
Congressman Rangel, and the few other Korean War veterans in the
Congress, I suspect I have spent more time on the Korean peninsula,
trying to obtain a better understanding of the people, politics, and
problems of South Korea, than perhaps any other member of the
House of Representatives.
While I did not personally share in the suffering and sacrifices of
* Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) is the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. He delivered this speech before the Korean-
American Association in Seoul, South Korea on August 18, 1989.
1. See D. REESE, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR 1-2 (1964) (offering a description by
South Korean Ambassador John Muccio of the Korean conflict that began on June 25,
1950, as an all-out offensive). On that same day, the United Nations passed two resolu-
tions: G.A. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.1 (1950) and G.A. Res. 83, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/4/Rev.1 (1950). The first resolution requested that North Korea withdraw
from South Korean territory below the 38th parallel. G.A. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
4/Rev.1 (1950). The second resolution requested the support of United Nations mem-
bers in repelling the attack. G.A. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.1 (1950). On June
26, 1950, United States air and naval forces hastily entered combat to prevent the
imminent collapse of South Korea. D. REESE, supra, at 1; see also Jurisdiction Over
Offenses by United States Forces in Korea, July 12, 1950, 5 U.S.T. 1408-09, T.I.A.S.
No. 3012 (noting the absence of an official agreement between the United States and
Korea concerning the scope of United States intervention).
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those brave Americans who put their lives on the line to defend free-
dom in South Korea, I am not at all unmindful of the courage and the
constancy they displayed during the course of that bitter and bloody
conflict. Of course, the 54,000 Americans2 who lost their lives during
the Korean War constitute only a small number compared to the one
million South Koreans-men, women, and children-who perished dur-
ing the struggle to preserve South Korea's independence3 and the right
of the South Korean people to determine their own destiny. As a result
of that war and those sacrifices, the United States was able to demon-
strate that aggression does not pay, and that the free peoples of the
world are prepared to resist force with force.
Another positive outcome of that otherwise tragic war was the crea-
tion of a strong partnership between South Korea and the United
States. And I am here today to tell you that the Korean-American
partnership has been a real success story for both our countries. For
almost four decades it has preserved the peace and promoted stability
on the Korean peninsula, and we Americans are proud to have shared
the sacrifices and the triumphs of nearly forty years with our South
Korean allies.
I have returned to South Korea at a particularly auspicious moment
in your history. Having earlier wrought an economic miracle out of the
devastation of a bitter war, South Korea has, over the past two years,
engineered a stunning political miracle that has gone a long way to-
ward bringing genuine democracy to your country.
The long and continuing march on the road from dictatorship to de-
mocracy in South Korea has many heroes. There is, first and foremost,
the South Korean people, whose courageous willingness to put their ca-
reers and even their lives on the line for democracy was-and re-
mains-a reflection of their commitment to those fundamental values
on which my own country was founded over two centuries ago. The
progress which has been made in the effort to establish a genuine de-
mocracy in South Korea is also a reflection of the efforts on the part of
Korean leaders such as Roh Tae Woo, who was prepared to put the
interests of his nation ahead of his personal political interests, and Kim
Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, who for one dark year after another
held aloft the torch of liberty in South Korea." I would like to think, it
2. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 756 (1989).
3. 22 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 526 (15th ed. 1986).
4. See F. BUNGE, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 36-37 (1982) (describing the
role that the two Kims held in leading the opposition New Democratic Party, a major
force that prompted the democratic elections). In 1976, Kim Dae Jung received a five-
to eight-year prison term for leading the democratic movement and running as a candi-
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is also at least partially a result of American diplomacy, made effective
by a bipartisan consensus in the United States that the best way to
maintain peace and prosperity in South Korea was through the estab-
lishment of democracy, rather than by a continuation of repression.
The progress which has been made in establishing a system of real
political pluralism must not obscure the continuing obstacles to the es-
tablishment of a truly genuine democracy that must be overcome. So
long as people are imprisoned not for what they have done, but for
what they have said, and so long as people can be convicted of being an
enemy of the state on the basis of national security legislation that does
more to impair the faith of the citizenry in the fairness of the govern-
ment than it does to protect the country from the real threat of subver-
sion, it will not be possible to say that the people of South Korea are
fully free. Nevertheless, the hard and undeniable fact is that the South
Korean people have gone a long way toward laying the groundwork for
what we hope will be an enduring political stability and continued eco-
nomic prosperity. These conditions are as much in the American as in
the Korean interest, and their achievement amply testifies to the vigor
and vitality of United States-Korean ties.
This is not to say that there are not potential problems that could
destabilize relations between our two countries. It does seem to be the
case, however, that the people in each nation who are most apt to criti-
cize the U.S.-South Korean relationship are those who do not appreci-
ate the extent to which this partnership has succeeded in preserving
peace and promoting prosperity for almost four decades. There are
some Americans, for instance, who have called for the unilateral with-
drawal of all American forces from the Korean peninsula. There are
others who have suggested a more modest but still significant with-
drawal, presumably in the hope that by so doing, substantial cost sav-
ings can be achieved.'
Yet, upon examination, this argument fails to withstand close scru-
tiny. Unless the withdrawn troops are actually demobilized, there will
date in the 1973 election. Id. After the assassination of President Park in 1979, how-
ever, the newly elected Choi Kyu Hah released Kim Dae Jung and promised direct
presidential elections. Id. at 176-77. During Kim Dae Jung's absence, Kim Young Sam
gained some prominence and formed a new political party. Id. at 182-83. In May of
1980, the government again decreed martial law and arrested the two Kims. Id. Kim
Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam later joined to lead an opposition party after their
release from prolonged prison terms. Id.; Jameson, Two Rivals Vow Unity for South
Korean Democracy, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at Al (describing the meeting between
the two former rivals).
5. See, e.g., S. 1264, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 7516 (1989) (offering
a proposal by Senator Dale Bumpers requiring the removal of 10,000 out of 43,000
troops presently in Korea no later than 1992).
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be no budgetary savings; troops simply redeployed elsewhere would cost
at least as much as if they were maintained in Korea. And if they were
fully demobilized, this would still save only modest sums, while at the
same time diminishing the credibility of the American defense commit-
ment to South Korea.
The presence of 43,000 American troops in South Korea serves as a
tangible manifestation of the United States commitment to the security
of South Korea. As long as a significant indigenous military imbalance
continues to exist on the Korean peninsula, the United States should
not withdraw any of its forces from South Korea, unless the Republic
of Korea has taken steps to increase its own forces so as to offset the
United States cuts and ensure that there is no loss in deterrent capabil-
ity. A unilateral American troop withdrawal, without any compensa-
tory increases in Republic of Korea forces, would significantly diminish
the deterrent value of our mutual security treaty, thereby threatening
the preservation of peace on the peninsula.
Unless we are willing to move South Korea outside the United States
defense perimeter-which we tried once before with regrettable re-
sults,6 and which we are emphatically not prepared to do again-it
would be exceedingly unwise to take a step that might well be ex-
tremely costly in terms of the blood and treasure that would be re-
quired to repel a North Korean attack if deterrence failed, simply to
save a marginal sum of money. We must keep reminding those Ameri-
cans who push for the unilateral withdrawal of United States forces
that, across the border, barely 30 miles for Seoul, lies a hostile North
Korea run by one of the most repressive regimes in the world, a regime
which has never renounced its ambition of reunifying the Korean pe-
ninsula under Communist control.
As South Koreans hardly need to be told, North Korea currently
enjoys significant military advantages in men and materiel. With a
trained army of one million troops, it has fifty-six percent more men
under arms than the South. It also has a two or three to one advantage
in armor and artillery, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
self-propelled artillery.
Fortunately, since the South's economy is five times the size of the
North's, it should be possible to establish an indigenous balance on the
peninsula over the course of the next decade. In the meantime, as
South Korea continues to increase its military capabilities, we should
6. Address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the National Press Club (Jan.
12, 1950) 12 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 426, 431-32 (R. Bennett
& R. Turner eds. 1950).
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not preclude the possibility of partial reductions of United States
forces. There is nothing immutable about the figure of 43,000 men.
Not all that long ago, there were 80,000 American troops in South
Korea. More recently, there have been as few as 40,000.7 Indeed, what
was truly impressive about this drawdown a few years ago was the
manner in which it was done without in any way diminishing the
American commitment to South Korea or the value of the American
deterrent. So one can easily imagine the possibility of some reductions
in the future.
Even in the context of the achievement of an acceptable balance of
power, however, I strongly believe that the United States should not
totally withdraw its forces from South Korea unless there has been a
dramatic reduction of North-South tensions that has eliminated the
threat of war on the Korean peninsula. So long as the threat of war
remains, the requirements of deterrence remain with it.
If recent press reports are correct that North Korea has taken the
first incipient steps to achieve an indigenous nuclear weapons capabil-
ity,8 such steps would constitute a deeply disturbing development which
should concern everyone who cares about the survival of the Korean
people. Considering this new factor in the security equation, it may
make sense to explore the possibility of negotiating an agreement be-
tween the two Koreas, as well as the People's Republic of China, the
Soviet Union, and the United States, designed to preclude both the de-
velopment and deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean penin-
sula, thereby allaying both the South's fears of the North's capability
and the North's fear of the alleged presence of United States nuclear
weapons in the South. Such an agreement, which clearly would have to
be accompanied by comprehensive and effective verification procedures,
would go a long way toward preventing a nuclear arms race on the
Korean peninsula.
In addition to those Americans concerned about security issues,
many other Americans are more concerned about the existence of an
almost $10 billion trade deficit between our two countries. Of course,
with a bilateral trade balance very much in South Korea's favor,9 and
7. The Military Balance 1988-89, INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 28 (1988).
8. Oberdorfer, North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Arms, Wash. Post, July 29, 1989, at
A9; Fialka, North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons, Wall
St. J., July 19, 1989, at A16.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE REP., FOREIGN EcONO.tc TRENDS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (KOREA), 7 (June, 1989) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE REP.] (offering a comprehensive evaluation of the Korean eco-
nomic picture).
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at a time when the United States has a global trade deficit of $137
billion, 10 it is incumbent upon Seoul to respond creatively to American
concerns if ways to contain protectionist pressures in the United States
are going to be found. At the same time, however, it is equally impor-
tant that Americans remember that for all the economic progress that
South Korea has achieved over the past quarter century, South Kore-
ans still do not enjoy anything approaching the standard of living of
our European and Japanese friends. West Germany's per capita income
is over $10,000; France's, $9,200; Britain's, $7,800; and Japan's,
$16,000.11 South Korea's per capita income, on the other hand, has
only recently surpassed $4,000.12 So while Americans have ample rea-
son to be concerned about their trade deficit with South Korea, one
would hope that we do not overexaggerate its significance.
It is also true that South Korea has taken a number of constructive
steps to address specific United States complaints about unfair Korean
practices. Your currency revaluation over the past two and a half years
has had the effect of reducing what had been an artificial exchange
rate advantage. Last May, representatives of our governments reached
agreements that avoided the legal necessity, under the Super 301 re-
quirements of last year's Omnibus Trade Act, of considering retaliatory
measures against South Korea. 3 Significant progress is being made on
"local content" issues. Korean investment regulations are being
amended so as to afford more equitable treatment to foreign businesses
that wish to operate in South Korea. 4
Finally, Americans would do well to recall that, according to the
United States Trade Representative, even if South Korea eliminated all
its trade barriers, a bilateral trade deficit would still remain as a result
of structural and other factors. Under these circumstances, Americans
and Koreans need to be cautious about pushing trade disputes to the
point where they could jeopardize important political ties between our
countries.
10. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FIN. STATISTICS (1989).
11. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1989 xiv (30th ed. 1988).
12. Id. at xv.
13. See Park, International Trade-Agreement Between the United States and the
Republic of Korea Concerning Insurance Market Access and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Republic of Korea, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 166, 168-170 (1987) (noting
that United States investigations ceased after the two countries agreed that South Ko-
rea would strengthen its intellectual property protection).
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE REP., supra note 9, at 8-9 (including a summary
of the July 1, 1987, laws passed to help alleviate violations in intellectual property
rights); see also Airgram from American Embassy in Seoul to Department of
State-unclassified (June 28, 1989) (noting that since the July 1987 laws were passed
there has been some improvement in protections).
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In addition to being more sensitive to the military imbalance and to
economic realities on the Korean peninsula, the United States also
needs to pay attention to the understandable and legitimate nationalis-
tic concerns of the South Korean people. I would hope, for instance,
that we would be prepared to press ahead with plans to relocate United
States army headquarters out of Seoul into a less-populated part of the
country. We have to understand that for many South Koreans, the
presence of the headquarters complex, complete with an extensive golf
course, in the midst of some of Seoul's priciest real estate constitutes a
running political and nationalistic affront. The United States has
agreed in principle to relocation. We now need to move forward with
the implementation of this agreement. One way to do this is for the
Korean government, given the opportunity to reclaim this choice land,
to agree to assume all reasonable costs associated with the relocation.
Finally, we should accelerate the current discussions on shifting com-
mand of the combined United States-Korean forces in South Korea
from an American to a South Korean general. Such a move is long
overdue. Today there are approximately 640,000 South Korean troops
under United Nations command, compared to 43,000 American troops.
Given this disparity, it is easy to understand why many South Koreans
resent having a foreigner in seemingly perpetual command of their
armed forces. Moreover, many South Koreans are fully aware of the
World War II practice where British and American troops served
under the command of whichever nation contributed the larger force in
that particular theater. There seems no reason why we cannot abandon
these anachronistic arrangements so as to be responsive to South Ko-
rean sensitivities without in any way diminishing the credibility of
America's defense commitment to South Korea or undermining the le-
gal fiction that United States forces are here as part of the United
Nations command.
But just as there are people in the United States who, through misin-
formation or malevolence, create problems for the bilateral relation-
ship, so too are there those in South Korea whose actions and argu-
ments threaten to poison the well of Korean-American relations. And
just as there are steps the United States might take to ward off poten-
tial problems before they become major difficulties, so too are there
comparable actions the South Korean government might take as well.
While recognizing that a substantial majority of the Korean people
appreciate the role the United States continues to play in the defense
and development of South Korea, the American people have been
deeply disturbed by the spread of anti-American sentiment in South
Korea beyond the small group of radical students where it has festered
1989]
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for a number of years. Ironically, this new anti-Americanism has been
facilitated by the growth of democracy, since it is now far easier to
voice such sentiments than it was when the government tightly con-
trolled political expression.
There are those, for instance, who persist in condemning the United
States for its alleged role in the 1980 Kwangju massacre."0 At this late
date, it should hardly be necessary to say again that the two battalions
of the Special Warfare Command initially involved in the atrocities at
Kwangju-those troops responsible for most of the civilian casual-
ties-were not under the operational control of the American com-
mander. In fact, American authorities had no prior knowledge that
these units were being sent to Kwangju and were not even aware of
their presence there.16 Nor were the 20th Division troops that subse-
quently entered Kwangju under United States operational control,
since they had been removed from the combined forces command ear-
lier, which the South Korean government was entitled to do under the
agreement. Now is it true that American officials were consulted prior
to the dispatch of the 20th Division forces. By this time, however, news
of the violence in Kwangju had leaked out, and the American authori-
ties concluded that if negotiations to bring about a peaceful resolution
of the crisis failed, it would be desirable to have the 20th Division,
which had received riot-control training, replace the far more brutal
Special Warfare troops as a way of averting further bloodshed.
The crucial point, however, is that we had no legal authority to block
the dispatch of the 20th Division, even if we had wanted to, and hon-
estly believed in any case that sending these units to Kwangju would
diminish the likelihood of continued violence. So in reality, rather than
approving or encouraging the events at Kwangju, American authorities
remained largely ignorant of them until after most of the blood had
already been shed. At no time were they in a position to have taken
decisive action to prevent the bloodletting which took place.
None of this is to condone what happened at Kwangju. The events
there were tragic and terrible. They deserve to be denounced and de-
plored. But this constant condemnation of the United States, as distin-
15. See Seoul Students Attack U.S. Embassy, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1988, at 3
(noting that students held signs blaming the United States for the Kwangju massacre).
The incident occurred following the government's declaration of martial law and the
arrest of opposition leaders Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam; BUNGE, supra note 3,
at 182-83 (offering a description of the events).
16. See U.S. Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea,
in May 1980, June 19, 1989 (offering a detailed State Department White Paper ac-
count of the events).
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guished from legitimate criticism of those Korean officials who were
actually responsible for the affair, hardly constitutes a constructive con-
tribution to good relations between our two countries.
There are also a handful of South Koreans who throw Molotov cock-
tails and demand the immediate withdrawal from South Korea of all
United States troops. Let me assure you that the American people will
not wish to support the presence of American troops where they are not
welcome. If South Korea wants to terminate the mutual security treaty
and desires that American forces withdraw from the peninsula, we
would immediately and undoubtedly comply with its wishes, however
unwise and unwelcome such a request would be.
Yet my very strong impression is that the bomb-throwers represent
only an irresponsible minority of the Korean people. If this is in fact
the case, then it is incumbent upon the Korean government to let the
United States government and the American people know clearly and
unmistakably that the majority of South Koreans want the United
States to remain in South Korea. Otherwise, the American people will
draw an erroneous conclusion about Korean desires, and domestic sup-
port for maintaining the American presence in South Korea will
evaporate.
Some Koreans have seized upon the trade disputes between our two
countries to question the value of the entire South Korean-American
relationship. Yet even many Koreans who do not challenge the underly-
ing premises binding our two peoples together frequently fail to under-
stand the intensity of American feelings on these economic matters.
With a substantial surplus in their favor, it is important that South
Koreans understand that, for Americans, fair trade is a precondition
for free trade. And in the eyes of many Americans, a number of South
Korean trade practices have been neither fair nor free.
Take agricultural goods, for instance. South Korea continues to ex-
clude imports of many American farm goods, while strict quotas limit
trade in numerous other agricultural items.17 Beef is one example, but
hardly the only one. If our two governments cannot resolve their differ-
ences on Korean treatment of American beef exports by the end of
September, President Bush is required by law to make a determination
on unfair trade practices and on whether retaliatory measures should
be taken. It hardly needs to be said that a spiral of retaliation will be in
neither South Korea's interest nor our own.
We have similar problems with telecommunications equipment and
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE REP., supra note 9, at 8 (June, 1989) (offering a
summary of the 1988 agricultural trade between the two nations).
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services. These are disputes which must be resolved by next February if
legally-mandated United States action, possibly including retaliation, is
to be avoided. South Korea is also on a special watch list for intellec-
tual property rights violations. It now has good, tough laws on the
books protecting intellectual property rights.' 8 Unfortunately, they are
not vigorously enforced. Here, too, progress is needed if we are to avoid
the sort of acrimonious commercial disputes that serve only to under-
mine our confidence in each other.
Finally, there are South Koreans who seek to blame the United
States for the continued division of the Korean peninsula. Let me make
it clear that the United States fully supports the peaceful reunification
of the Korean peninsula under conditions compatible with the ability of
the Korean people to determine their own destiny. We endorse the goal
of reunification because we understand that this reflects the deepest as-
pirations of the Korean people.
But the United States also supports the objective of eventual reunifi-
cation because we believe that the peaceful reunification of the two
Koreas would be very much in the American interest. Reunification
would significantly decrease the threat of another war on the peninsula,
which in turn would remove a potential flashpoint for a Soviet-Ameri-
can confrontation. And at a time when regional conflicts are being re-
solved around the world-in southern Africa, in the Persian Gulf, in
Afghanistan, and in Southeast Asia-Americans would applaud similar
progress toward the peaceful and political resolution of the differences
between the two Koreas. So make no mistake about it: The United
States fully sympathizes with and supports the hopes and aspirations of
virtually all Koreans for the eventual reunification of Korea.
Pending the reestablishment of a reunified Korea, the United States
would also strongly back any and all efforts to facilitate the reunifica-
tion of divided families, the elimination of barriers to the exchange of
mail and other forms of communication, and the development of mutu-
ally rewarding economic relations between the two Koreas. Indeed, the
initiation of such humanitarian and economic arrangements would go a
long way toward creating the kind of trust and confidence which will be
necessary to facilitate progress on the broader and more difficult politi-
cal issue of reunification.
The Korean-American partnership is one of the great success stories
of the postwar period. For over a third of a century, it has contributed
18. See Park, supra note 13, at 168-70 (discussing the comprehensive bill intro-
duced in the South Korean National Assembly covering extended patent, trademark,
and copyright protection).
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to peace on the Korean peninsula and stability in the region. But
changes have taken place on the peninsula, and especially in South Ko-
rea, that ought to be reflected in that relationship.
We do not need dramatic policy shifts. We should avoid abrupt, let
alone unilateral, changes. But with wise leadership in both Seoul and
Washington, from people who understand how helpful this partnership
has been in preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, we
ought to be able to fine-tune the relationship in a way that will carry
Korean-American relations on a smooth course into the twenty-first
century. As a member of the United States Congress, I am convinced
that only in this fashion will American interests be adequately safe-
guarded. And as a friend and admirer of the Korean people, I am
equally convinced that such a prescription would serve the interests of
South Korea as well.
